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Many verifiable contracts are impossible or difficult to enforce. This applies to contracts among family
and friends, contracts regulating market transactions, and sovereign debt contracts. Do such non-
enforceable contracts matter? We use a version of the trust game with participants from Norway and
Tanzania to study repayment decisions in the presence of non-enforceable loan contracts. Our main
finding is that the specific content of the contract has no effect on loan repayment. Rather, the
borrowers seem to be motivated by other moral motives, which contributes to explaining why they
partly fulfill non-enforceable contracts. We also show that some borrowers violate the axiom of
first-order stochastic dominance when rejecting loan offers. This seems partly to be due to negative
reciprocity, but may also reflect that there are individuals who have a preference for not accepting
something referred to as a “loan.”
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1. Introduction
Contracts are often difficult to enforce. This applies to contracts among
family and friends, contracts regulating market transactions, and international
contracts. The most prominent reasons why certain contracts are hard to enforce
are a lack of institutions for enforcing them, problems related to third-party
verification of the terms of the contract, and enforcement costs. It may be pro-
hibitively difficult for a family member to enforce a loan contract with another
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family member, or for an employer to have some types of labor contracts enforced.
To illustrate the latter, consider the case where an employee has committed herself
to work for a company for a certain period of time, but is then offered a better
opportunity in a different company. In such a case, if the commitment is verbal it
is hard for outsiders to verify what the true contract is. But even if the obligation
is in writing, it may not be beneficial for the employer to insist that the employee
sticks to the terms of the contract as the latter may retaliate by putting in very little
effort. Similarly, it may sometimes be very hard for companies to enforce contracts
with suppliers located in other countries, since it may be extremely costly to take
the case to court. Sovereign debt contracts are the quintessential example of
non-enforceable contracts, as there are no international courts with the power to
make recalcitrant borrowers honor their obligations, and even though contracts
are usually subject to the courts of some country these rarely have the means
necessary to enforce their verdicts (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff,
1989; Tomz and Wright, 2007; Panizza et al., 2009).
What, then, is the role of non-enforceable contracts? The classical view in
economics is that non-enforceable contracts are nothing but cheap talk. If every-
one understands that the contract is non-enforceable, then it plays no role in
determining the actions of the contracting partners. The contract may still, of
course, be fulfilled, for example due to reputation considerations, but the contract-
ing partners will always renege on the contract if it is in their self-interest to do so.
The recent literature on social preferences, however, has convincingly shown that
people are not only selfishly concerned, but also motivated by moral consider-
ations (Camerer, 2003; Konow, 2003). This may have important implications
for our understanding of the role of non-enforceable contracts. It may be that
people consider it a moral duty in itself to fulfill a contract, even when it is
non-enforceable. The contract may serve as a reference point and create moral
entitlements (Hart and More, 2008; Fehr et al., 2009, 2011a, 2011b), and thus the
non-enforceable contract may turn out to be crucial in determining the actions
of the contracting partners. But it is not obvious that morally motivated people
assign such a role to the contract. Possibly, they may rather focus on other moral
arguments considered relevant when there is a conflict of interest, which may
overturn any concern they have for fulfilling the contract obligations.
In order to study the role of non-enforceable contracts in a setting where other
moral motives also enter the picture, we conducted a version of the trust game with
participants from Norway and Tanzania.1 The matching of participants from one
of the richest and one of the poorest countries in the world made needs consider-
ations a salient feature of the situation. Furthermore, we introduced a random
shock in the second part of the trust game, which implied that fairness consider-
ations related to this shock could also potentially affect the participants’ behavior.
In the experiment, some participants were asked to determine how much
money they wanted to lend to another participant on the basis of information
about the nationality of the borrower and the contract type. The contract was
1For other studies introducing a contract in the trust game, see Malhotra and Murnighan (2002),
Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009), and Rigdon (2009). See also Irlenbusch (2006) for an early experi-
mental analysis of how social norms may affect behavior in transactions governed by non-binding
contracts.
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either a fixed interest contract or a surplus sharing contract. If the other partici-
pant accepted the contract, the money was automatically invested in a risky project
which had an expected return that was twice the expected interest on the loan size
specified in the contract. When the outcome of the investment was realized, the
borrower was free to determine how much he wanted to repay, that is, the loan
contract was non-enforceable.
Our main finding is that the specific content of non-enforceable loan contracts
does not appear to play an important role in explaining repayment behavior. In
particular, repayment behavior does not depend on contract type. Rather, other
moral motives seem to be more salient for the borrowers, including reciprocity,
fairness, and needs considerations. Still, we cannot rule out, given our design, that
the presence of a contract in itself played some role for the participants, even
though the specific contract type did not matter. In our setting, the contract may
partly have strengthened the reciprocal motive and weakened needs consider-
ations. We also show that some borrowers reject the offer of a non-enforceable
loan contract, which suggests that non-selfish considerations matter for the par-
ticipants. In some cases, rejecting the contract represents a violation of the axiom
of first-order stochastic dominance, and we provide evidence suggesting that this
partly reflects a fundamental aversion against uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample and the
experimental design. Section 3 analyzes the lenders’ decisions about how much of
their endowment to offer as a loan, and the borrowers’ decisions about whether or
not to accept the loan and honor the non-enforceable contract. Section 4 provides
some concluding remarks.
2. Design
In this section, we start by providing an overview of the main features of
the experiment, before we move to a more detailed discussion of the sample and
design.
2.1. Main Features
We conducted a version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) with participants
located in Norway and Tanzania. At the beginning of the experiment, all partici-
pants were given a complete description of how the experiment would proceed. At
both locations, as part of the introduction, a research assistant took an overview
picture of the lab and immediately uploaded it to an internet site. The pictures
from both locations were then shown to all participants on their computers after
the introduction was completed.We did this to familiarize the participants with the
idea that they were taking part in an international experiment where they would
interact with participants in another country. The pictures also ensured that the
participants believed that there were actual recipients in the other lab, but they did
not reveal any information beyond what can be observed by a participant when
entering a lab.
All interaction between the participants was anonymous and conducted
through a web-based interface. English was the language of communication in
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both countries. It is an official language in Tanzania and Norwegian students are
also fluent in English. The show-up fees were calibrated to reflect local costs, but
all participants faced the same incentives in the experiment. The average payment
from the experiment was 81 USD for the participants in Norway and 68 USD for
the participants in Tanzania.
At the beginning of the experiment each participant was given an endowment
of 50 USD, and was then randomly and with equal probability assigned the role of
lender or borrower. We endowed lenders and borrowers with the same amount
of money in order to rule out unequal endowments as a motive for lending. The
borrowers kept their endowment, unless they used it to honor the loan contract.
The main feature of the design was that the participants could agree on a non-
enforceable loan contract. The money borrowed was automatically invested in a
risky investment project with an expected gain equal to twice the amount invested.
The lenders chose whether to offer loans in four types of situations, which only
differed with respect to whom they were paired with and the type of contract they
could offer: a fixed repayment contract or a surplus sharing contract. When the
outcome of the investment was realized, the borrower was free to determine how
much he wanted to repay, that is, the loan contract was non-enforceable. An
overview of the experimental design is given in Table A.1.2
When all borrowers had made their repayment decisions, the computer ran-
domly and with equal probability selected one of the situations that each of the
participants had been involved in as the one that determined the outcome for
them. The final payment from the experiment was the amount they received in the
selected situation plus the show-up fee.
At the end of the experiment, each participant was assigned a payment
code on their screen, which they were asked to write down on a payment form that
was in a folder next to their computer. After the experiment was completed, the
computer generated a list of the payment codes together with the corresponding
amounts earned in the experiment for research assistants that were not present in
the lab. On the basis of this list, the assistants prepared envelopes containing the
payments. When the assistants had prepared all the envelopes, they placed them in
a box and transferred them to the lab. They then immediately left the lab so that
no one in the lab knew how much money each of the envelopes contained. The
envelopes were then given to the participants in accordance with the payment code
they had been assigned. The payment procedure was designed to ensure that no
one in the lab, not even members of the research group, would know how much
each participant earned from the experiment.
2.2. Sample
A total of 128 participants from the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania
and 113 participants from the University of Bergen, Norway participated in six
sessions run simultaneously in the two countries. The participants were recruited
among the social science students at the two universities. The average age of the
participants was 23.1 years in Norway and 24.2 years in Tanzania. The gender
2All tables and figures with the prefix “A” are found in the online appendix to this paper.
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composition was balanced in both countries; the share of males was 47.2 percent
in Norway and 50.9 percent in Tanzania. All participants in Tanzania were
Tanzanians, but we cannot rule out that some of the participants in the Norwegian
lab were non-Norwegians. Still, for short, we will refer to the nationality of the
participants as uniquely determined by their location.
In the analysis, we assume that the participants in both countries consider the
Tanzanian participants, on average, more needy than the Norwegian participants.
Aggregate statistics show huge income gaps between the two countries, where real
GDP per capita is 47 times higher in Norway than in Tanzania (International
Comparison Program, 2008, table 6). This difference is also reflected in the average
standard of living for students in the respective countries. To illustrate, the average
disposable income (including transfers) of regular full-time students not living with
parents is about 16,600 USD per year in Norway (Løwe and Sæther, 2007, table 4).
In contrast, the typical self-assessment among students in the African countries
has been that “the majority of us come from poor families . . . our parents have
already sold pieces of land, herds of cattle . . . to pay . . . tuition fees” (East Africa
in Focus, September 22, 2009). And indeed, there have been riots and strikes over
undisbursed student loans and stipends intended to help the students pay for
books and meals at the University of Dar-es-Salaam and Makerere University.
This disadvantageous situation has also been recognized by the donor community,
and both universities receive support from international donors.
The long-term outlooks are also very different for the two groups of students.
Al-Samarrai and Bennell (2007) report that university graduates with some years
of experience in Tanzania had an average monthly income of 275 USD, and they
point out that “[m]any university graduates were part-time entrepreneurs gener-
ating secondary income that is essential for their household survival, but these
part-time activities were invariably limited in scale and sophistication” (p. 31).
And some of the participants also explicitly make reference to a difference in need
when motivating their choices, as illustrated by the explanation of participant 45:
“I had a lower threshold of not repaying the complete amount of the Norwegian
loans, as I assumed all Norwegian students are better off than the Tanzanians.”3
When interpreting the results, however, we should keep in mind that some par-
ticipants may have focused on the relative, and not absolute, living standard of
students in their country, which may weaken the perception of the African stu-
dents as more needy than the European students.4
2.3. Lending
Lenders were asked how much of the endowment they wanted to lend to
another participant, where the choice set was 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 USD. They
made choices in four one-shot situations, where in each situation they were paired
with a different participant. To accommodate differences in session size, a few
participants only made decisions in three situations. Since only one of the situa-
tions would be realized, the lenders could lend the entire endowment or less in each
situation.
3Participant 45 refers to the anonymous code of this participant in the experiment.
4See also Cappelen et al. (2013).
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Before making a choice, the lender was given information about the poten-
tial borrower’s nationality and the type of debt contract he could offer. In two
situations he could offer a fixed interest rate contract, which specified that the
borrower should repay the loan amount plus a fixed interest of 50 percent. The
contract repayment amount was thus independent of the outcome from the risky
investment. In two other situations the lenders could offer a surplus sharing
contract, which specified that the borrowers should repay the loan amount plus
50 percent of the return on the investment. If the surplus sharing contract was
honored, the expected return to the lender would be the same as if the fixed
interest rate contract was honored, but under the surplus sharing contract the
lender would be entitled to less if the investment was a failure and more if it was
successful.
For each contract type, the lenders were paired once with a borrower from the
same country and once with a borrower from the other country.
2.4. Borrowing and Repayment
Participants who were assigned the role as borrowers were asked to accept or
reject loan offers in up to four situations. Each offer consisted of a loan size and a
contract type. Before they made a decision on whether to accept the loan offer,
they were also informed of the nationality of the lender. If they accepted the offer,
the loan was automatically invested in a risky project. The return on the invest-
ment was, with equal probability, 0, 100, or 200 percent; thus the expected return
was 100 percent.
The fixed interest rate contracts specified a repayment of 150 percent of the
loan size. Thus, if the investment failed, the borrowers had to cover the interest
from their own endowment if they were to honor the contract. In the two other
possible investment outcomes, the return on the investment would more than
cover the interest on the loan and the borrowers would earn a net surplus from the
investment even if they honored the contract. The expected gain from accepting
and honoring a fixed loan contract would be 50 percent.
The surplus sharing contracts specified a repayment that depended on the
outcome of the investment. If the investment failed, there would be no interest, and
the contract specified that the borrower should only pay back the loan amount. If
the return on the investment was 100 percent, the borrower had to pay a 50 percent
interest rate, the same as with fixed interest, to honor the surplus sharing contract;
if the return was 200 percent, the interest rate would be 100 percent. The expected
gain from accepting and honoring a surplus sharing contract would be the same
as with a fixed interest contract, 50 percent, but it is less risky than a fixed interest
contract. In fact, accepting and honoring a surplus sharing contract first-order
stochastically dominates not accepting it (in monetary terms).
When the computer had determined the investment outcome, the borrower
had to decide how much to repay the lender. The choice set was discrete, so
repayment had to be done in units of 5 USD. Before making a decision, the
borrower was reminded of the nationality of the lender and the terms of the loan
contract. They were also reminded that they were free to decide how much they
wanted to repay since the loan contract could not be enforced.
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3. Analysis
In this section,we analyze the data from the three types of decisionsmade in the
experiment: the lender’s decisiononhowmuch loan tooffer, the borrower’s decision
on whether to accept or reject the loan offer, and the borrower’s decision on how
much to repay.Overall, there are 472 loan situations, and as shown inTable A.2, we
have a good balance in the matching of lenders and borrowers across nationality.
3.1. Loan Offers
Figure A.1 shows the distribution of the loan offers by country. We observe
that the lenders offered less than the full endowment, which is not surprising given
that the loan contract is non-enforceable. Still, the large majority of the lenders
offered positive amounts (93.4 percent), where the average loan offer was 29.7
USD out of an endowment of 50 USD. The distribution of loan offers is less
compressed in Norway than in Tanzania, with fewer Tanzanians offering nothing
or everything, but the average offer, also when broken down on the country of
borrower and by loan contract, is strikingly similar in the two countries.
In panel A in Table 1, we break down the loan offers by the nationality of the
borrower and by loan contract.5 Interestingly, we observe that the nationality of
the borrower does not matter for the lenders, which is consistent with needs
considerations not being salient in the lending decision. Alternatively, it may
reflect that needs and trustworthiness considerations go in opposite directions.
Furthermore, we observe that lenders do not differentiate between contract types.
The fact that lenders offer positive loan amounts is a strong indication that they
expect borrowers to not act completely selfishly, but rather to be motivated by
moral considerations.
3.2. Accepting or Rejecting
Amajority of the loan offers were accepted by the borrowers, but a substantial
fraction, close to 30 percent, was rejected. The Norwegians rejected 20.3 percent
and the Tanzanians rejected 38.9 percent of the loan offers, and this difference is
statistically significant alsowhen broken downby country of borrower and contract
type. We observe that there is an in-group–out-group difference, with more accep-
tance of loans from lenders with the same nationality, but this difference is not
significant in any of the two countries (p = 0.26, Norway; p = 0.34, Tanzania).
The high rejection rate is striking, since the expected return for the borrower
from accepting and honoring the loan contract is 50 percent. So how can it be
explained?6 With a fixed interest rate contract, risk aversion provides a possible
explanation. A morally motivated borrower may find the fixed repayment contract
too risky, since she would plan to honor the contract even if there is no return on
the investment. As shown in panel B in Table 1, however, the rejection rate does
not depend on contract type; it is equally high for the surplus sharing contract.
5In Tables A.3–A.5, we provide a detailed breakdown of average loan offers, acceptance rates, and
share repaid.
6Clearly, we cannot rule out that some of the rejections of high loan offers reflect that participants
misunderstood the instructions.
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This is a striking finding, since a borrower cannot lose money on a surplus sharing
contract. Accepting a surplus sharing contract first-order stochastically dominates
rejecting the contract, even for a borrower who intends to honor the contract. If
the investment fails, there is no interest on the loan, and the borrower is equally
well off as if she had rejected the contract. If there is a positive return on the
investment, on the other hand, the borrower receives a substantial net surplus from
accepting the surplus sharing contract.7
7The rejection of surplus sharing contract is consistent with the uncertainty effect demonstrated
by Gneezy et al. (2006). They show, both in field and lab experiments, that there are choice situations
in which individuals value a risky prospect less than its worst possible realization.
TABLE 1
Loan Offers, Acceptance Rates, and the Shares Repaid
A. Loan Amounts Offered
Country of Borrower Contract Type
Country of Lender Norway Tanzania Fixed Interest Surplus Sharing All
Norway 28.81 30.60 28.30 31.02 29.70
(2.01) (2.07) (2.14) (2.01) (1.98)
n 118 116 117 117 234
Tanzania 28.73 30.50 28.99 30.25 29.62
(1.70) (1.56) (1.68) (1.56) (1.46)
n 118 120 119 119 238
p-value of no difference 0.974 0.968 0.821 0.761 0.974
B. Average Acceptance Rates
Country of Lender Contract Type
Country of Borrower Norway Tanzania Fixed Interest Surplus Sharing All
Norway 0.83 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.80
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
n 104 113 108 109 217
Tanzania 0.58 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.61
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
n 105 119 112 112 224
p-value of no difference <0.001 0.030 0.011 0.002 <0.001
C. Average Share Repaid
Country of Lender Contract Type
Country of Borrower Norway Tanzania Fixed Interest Surplus Sharing All
Norway 0.838 0.987 0.888 0.938 0.913
(0.083) (0.083) (0.079) (0.078) (0.073)
n 86 87 87 86 173
Tanzania 0.916 0.857 0.848 0.922 0.884
(0.096) (0.076) (0.080) (0.092) (0.072)
n 61 76 71 66 137
p-value of no difference 0.540 0.250 0.721 0.891 0.772
Note: Average rates by country of borrower, country of lender, and contract type. Loan offers of
0 USDwere never presented to the borrower, and are thus not included in the statistics. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are corrected for clustering on individuals, n is the number of observations in a cell. The
p-values are for tests of no difference between the rows above.
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Negative reciprocity provides one possible reason for rejecting the loan offer,
even with a surplus sharing contract. It is well established that people are willing
to sacrifice own monetary payoff to punish unkind behavior (Fehr et al., 1997;
Charness, 2004), and in the present experiment borrowers may have become
offended by small loan offers. They may have interpreted a small loan as a signal
that the lender does not consider them trustworthy, and as a consequence they may
have decided to punish the lender for not having trust in them.8 To study this
explanation more closely, we consider the distribution of acceptance rates across
loan offers, as shown in Figure A.2. In Tanzania, we observe that the acceptance
rate is much lower for the smallest loan offers than for the largest ones, on average
41.7 percent versus 80.0 percent. This pattern applies to both lenders from
Tanzania and from Norway, and lends support to Tanzanian borrowers being
motivated by negative reciprocity when rejecting small loan offers. We find a
similar, but less pronounced, relationship for Norwegian borrowers towards
Norwegian lenders, but not towards Tanzanian lenders.
Still, we observe that about 12.5 percent and 20.7 percent of the surplus
sharing loan offers of the full endowment were rejected in Norway and Tanzania,
respectively, which certainly cannot be explained by negative reciprocity. A pos-
sible explanation could be that there are individuals who have a preference for not
accepting something referred to as a “loan.” This would also be consistent with the
fact that acceptance rates are sensitive to loan size, if the disutility from acceptance
is independent of the loan size. The increasing acceptance of larger loans may then
simply reflect that larger loans generate bigger surpluses that are more likely to
offset the fixed disutility term.
3.3. Repayment
Did the borrowers honor the non-enforceable loan contract? The right panel
in Figure A.3 shows that a significant share of them did; 36.4 percent and 21.9
percent of the participants in Norway and Tanzania, respectively, returned at least
the contract amount to the lender. Moreover, in the left panel we observe that a
majority of the participants returned at least the loan amount, in both Norway and
Tanzania. Since the experiment was a one-shot game without any strategic reasons
for repaying, this provides clear evidence of moral motivation among the borrow-
ers in both Norway and Tanzania.
It is particularly striking to observe that only a very small share of the
participants fully exploited the non-enforceable nature of the contract and
returned nothing to the lender. This happened in 19 percent of the situations
involving Norwegian borrowers and in only 2.9 percent of the situations involving
Tanzanian borrowers. The high level of repayment in Tanzania clearly demon-
strates that it is a mistake to think of moral motivation as a luxury good that only
the rich can afford. Even in the presence of very high stakes and a non-enforceable
8An alternative strategy could of course be to accept the loan offer, but then punish the lender in
the repayment phase. It is not obvious, however, that morally motivated individuals would find it
appropriate to exploit an unkind act to their own advantage, even though it would have been a less
costly punishment strategy in monetary terms. Second, the rejection of unkind loan offers may also
reflect an emotional response, which did not involve strategic considerations of what would be the most
appropriate punishment strategy.
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contract, almost all Tanzanians decided to return a significant amount to the
lenders. On average, the borrowers returned 91.3 percent and 88.4 percent of
the loan amount in Norway and Tanzania, respectively, and we observe that the
distribution of repaid amount is more compressed in Tanzania than in Norway.
The fact that many borrowers returned a substantial amount is not very
informative of the motivational role played by the contract. To better understand
whether the non-enforceable contract motivated repayment, we need to study
whether contract type mattered for repayment behavior. In this respect, it is
important to keep in mind that since lenders did not differentiate between contract
type when deciding how much loan to offer, as shown in panel A in Table 1, and
borrowers did not differentiate between contract types when deciding whether to
accept or reject the contract, as shown in panel B in Table 1, the borrowers faced
on average the same contract amount and the same kind of situation under the two
contract types when deciding how much to repay. Thus, both honoring the con-
tract and being motivated by some other moral considerations would imply that
the average amount returned should be the same under the two contract types.
This is consistent with what we observe in panel C in Table 1. Even though the
share repaid is higher under a surplus sharing contract, the difference is not
statistically significant (p = 0.43, Norway; p = 0.44, Tanzania). We also observe
that there are no statistically significant differences between Norway and Tanzania
when the share repaid is broken down by country of lender and contract type.
If the contract itself motivated repayment, however, we should expect the
contract type to matter for how much the borrowers repaid under different out-
comes of the risky investment. The essential feature of the surplus sharing contract
was that the contract amount should depend on the investment outcome, whereas
the borrowers always faced the same contract amount under the fixed interest rate
contract. In Table 2, we report regressions for Norway and Tanzania that test
whether this difference mattered for the borrowers. We introduce the variable
surplus that measures the net return from the investment, and then interact it with
the contract type. The surplus itself may matter for fairness reasons, since bor-
rowers may consider it fair to share such a surplus with the lender.9 The interaction
term between the surplus variable and the fixed interest rate contract, however,
would capture whether sharing of the surplus was motivated by what is specified in
the contract. We therefore consider the significance of this interaction to capture
whether the contract itself motivated repayment.
We also include in the regression variables that capture other moral con-
siderations potentially motivating the borrower. There is considerable evidence
that people are motivated by reciprocal preferences and are willing to reward
kind actions even at a cost to themselves (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Falk and
Fischbacker, 2006), and the size of the loan offer, included in the regression, may
clearly be seen as a measure of the kindness of the lender’s action. Reciprocal
behavior may also reflect a concern for equality, since the size of the loan offer is
9This may reflect that borrowers find it fair to eliminate inequalities between themselves and
the lender that reflect factors beyond their control; see also Konow (2000), Frohlich et al. (2004), and
Cappelen et al. (2007, 2010b, 2013). See also Udry (1990) for a study of how the rate of interest on
informal loans in rural Nigeria depends positively on the luck of the borrower and negatively on the
luck of the lender.
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directly related to the amount that the lender is holding at the time when the
borrower has to make her decision about how much to return (Ashraf et al., 2006;
Cox et al., 2007; Cappelen et al., 2010a). Second, as shown by Eckel and
Grossman (1996) and Cappelen et al. (2013), needs considerations may also be a
powerful moral motive in many distributive situations. In the present experiment,
the borrower was reminded of the nationality of the lender before deciding how
much to return, and she might consider it morally imperative to return more to the
needy lenders in Tanzania. We capture the needs motive in the regression by an
indicator variable showing whether the lender was from Tanzania or not. Finally,
we include the background variables age and sex for the borrowers.
We observe from the interaction term that both Norwegian and Tanzanian
borrowers share less of the investment surplus with the lenders under a fixed
interest contract, but these differences are not statistically significant. We take this
as suggestive evidence that the contract itself does not motivate repayment behav-
ior. We do, however, observe that the other moral motives play an important role
in explaining repayment behavior. The reciprocal variable is highly significant for
TABLE 2
Regression of Repaid Amount on Loan Characteristics
and Background Variables
Norway Tanzania
Loan amount 0.99*** 0.48***
(0.15) (0.11)




Surplus · fixed interest rate contract −0.13 −0.055
(0.15) (0.15)
Lender from Tanzania 5.68* −1.43
(3.05) (2.66)
Borrower is female −0.45 −9.57*
(5.02) (4.90)






Note: Regression of repaid amount in USD, by the nation-
ality of the borrower. “Loan amount” is loan amount in USD;
“Fixed interest contract” is an indicator variable taking the value
1 if the borrower has accepted a fixed interest contract and the
value 0 if the borrower has accepted a surplus sharing contract;
“Surplus” is the return on the investment in USD; “Lender from
Tanzania” is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the lender
is from Tanzania and the value 0 if the lender is from Norway;
“Borrower is female” is an indicator variable taking the value
1 if the borrower is a female and the value 0 if the borrower
is a male; “Age” is the age of the borrower, measured in years.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering on
individuals ( *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01).
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both countries (p < 0.01), even though the point estimate is much higher for
Norwegian borrowers. Interestingly, we observe that the needs motive is only
significant for Norwegian borrowers (p = 0.068, Norway; p = 0.593, Tanzania).
The fairness motive appears most prominently for the Tanzanian borrowers,
where the surplus variable is statistically significant both under the surplus sharing
contract (p < 0.01) and under the fixed interest contract (p = 0.097); for Norwegian
borrowers, the surplus variable is only statistically significant under the surplus
sharing contract (p < 0.01).
Even though we do not find evidence of contract type playing a role in
explaining repayment behavior, we cannot rule out that the presence of a con-
tract in itself may have affected the borrowers. The contract may have strength-
ened the reciprocal motive, since responding positively to a large loan amount
also contributes to honoring the contract. Still, our point estimate for the
Norwegian borrowers is very close to what is typically observed in a trust game
without non-enforceable contracts (Camerer, 2003), and the point estimate for
the Tanzanian borrowers is much lower, and we thus doubt that the contract has
had a significant effect on the importance assigned to the reciprocal motive. The
contract may, however, also have affected the importance assigned to needs con-
siderations, and in this respect it is interesting to compare our results to Cappelen
et al. (2013), who study a distributive situation involving Norwegian and Tanza-
nian students without any non-enforceable contract. Whereas Cappelen et al.
(2013) find that Norwegian students assign less importance to needs consider-
ations than Tanzanian students, which is consistent with a self-serving bias in
moral motivation, we observe the opposite result where Norwegian borrowers
assign more importance to needs. In fact, there is no evidence of needs consid-
erations affecting repayment behavior for Tanzanian borrowers, which may
reflect that the presence of a non-enforceable contract crowded out the needs
motive for this group.
4. Concluding Remarks
Non-enforceable contracts are common in all societies, but their role is still
poorly understood. Are such contracts more than cheap talk, and, if so, why? We
have reported from an experiment suggesting that even though a significant share
of the participants honored (at least partly) the non-enforceable contract, the
contract itself was not crucial in explaining their behavior. The participants rather
seemed to have focussed on other relevant moral considerations, such as reciproc-
ity, fairness, and needs.
We do, however, find some suggestive evidence of the presence of the contract
affecting the importance assigned to the different moral considerations. In par-
ticular, we find that the Tanzanian participants did not pay attention to needs
considerations, which may reflect that they did not find such considerations rel-
evant in the presence of a contract. Our study thus points at two different ways that
non-enforceable contracts may change the behavior of morally motivated indi-
viduals; they may represent an independent moral consideration, but may also
influence the role played by other morally relevant arguments.
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